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Abstract-This study reviews the efforts of Singapore to curb road congestion through restraints on motor 
vehicle ownership as well as user fees. In particular, it traces the history of the famous Area Licensing Scheme 
(ALS), and then discusses its shortcomings, also the need for Electronic Road Pricing (ERP), its advantages 
and disadvantages and the technology involved in this state of the art system. This paper identifies important 
research questions to be addressed in connection with the first full-scale adoption of ERP. 0 1997 Elsevier 
Science Ltd. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Singapore is a small densely populated island city state with a population of 3.4 million and a land 
area of 648 square km. Economic growth has been very impressive, averaging 8% per year since 
the early 1960s. Singapore’s per capita gross national product in 1995 was S$34500 or approxi- 
mately US$24500 (where S$l = US$O.71) comparable to the United States and exceeding most 
western countries. As the country is hot and humid, air-conditioned private transportation is in 
great demand, and because of rapidly rising incomes, Singapore now has 342000 cars (95% pri- 
vately owned) out of 642 000 registered motor vehicles traveling on 3060 km of roads and resulting 
in a linear density of roughly 210 motor vehicles per km. This very high motor vehicular density 
compares with only 62 in the United Kingdom, 43 in Japan, and 27 in the United States (Lee, 
1991). More significantly, there are 44 cars per 100 households in Singapore, about two-and-a-half 
times higher than in Hong Kong, a comparable city state. 
The problem of traffic congestion reached a peak in early 1975 when average vehicular speeds 
during the morning and evening rush hours within the Central Business District was only 19 km h-l. 
To discourage vehicular ownership, the government imposed very high taxes. In a Consultant’s 
Report to the Automobile Association of Singapore (January 1995), one of the authors calculated 
that for a 1.6 liter Mazda 323 (automatic) subcompact which sold for an astounding S$128000, 
about S$85 000 went to cover government taxes, fees, and to pay for the Certificate of Entitlement 
(soon to be discussed), representing 67% of the price of the new car. In spite of high government 
taxes and car prices, high usage fees, and costly parking and petrol, many people were buying new 
cars, paying upwards of S$250 000 for a Mercedes (a top selling car in Singapore). See Toh (1994) 
for a detailed discussion of the high cost of motoring in Singapore. 
Realizing that high car prices were not a sufficient deterrent because the demand for cars in 
Singapore was more income-elastic at 1.0 than price-elastic at a.45 (Phang and Chin, 1990) the 
government has instituted a unique system of quotas on cars since May 1990. The Quota System 
has been extensively discussed and analyzed (Toh, 1992; Phang, 1992). Basically, it requires any- 
one who wants to buy a new motor vehicle to successfully bid for a Certificate of Entitlement 
(COE) at quarterly then monthly auctions in one of seven vehicular categories. But because the 
quota for vehicular growth was set at an average of only 3% per year, compared to a 9.8% 
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increase in the year prior to the introduction of the Quota System, the COEs (which were good for 
only 10 years) were bid up to astronomical levels, occasionally in excess of S$lOOOOO for luxury 
cars, leading to much frustration on the part of unsuccessful would-be new car owners. The point 
should be restated: the pent-up demand for cars in Singapore was such that people were willing to 
pay upwards of US$70000 for the right to own a car for 10 years. 
2. MANUAL ROAD CONGESTION PRICING: HISTORY 
Singapore has had more success controlling vehicular usage. In June 1975, the famous Area 
Licensing Scheme (ALS) was implemented, designating a restricted zone (RZ) of 610 ha essentially 
covering the Central Business District (CBD) and with 22 vehicular entry points at the outer 
boundaries. During the original restricted hours of 7:30 am to 9:30 am from Mondays to Satur- 
days, cars carrying fewer than four passengers had to prepurchase and display area licenses on 
their vehicle windscreens to enter the RZ. The ALS fee for cars was originally set at S$3 or S$60 
monthly. Compliance is manually enforced by the police stationed at each of the entry points 
recording the license plates of vehicles without valid licenses. 
Since its inception, the ALS has undergone numerous modifications to the restricted hours, fees, 
and categories of restricted vehicles (Table 1). 
Currently, the ALS operates from 7:30 am to 6:30 pm on weekdays and from 7:30 am to 2:00 pm 
on Saturdays, except public holidays. For entry into the RZ which now covers an area of 725 ha, 
with 33 manned gantries at the boundaries (Fig. l), a valid license must be purchased and dis- 
played by all vehicles (car pools are no longer exempt) except scheduled buses, police vehicles, and 
emergency vehicles. There are now two types of ALS licenses: Whole-Day which cost S$l for 
motorcycles and S$3 for other vehicles and which are valid for all hours of operation, and Part- 
Day which cost $0.70 for motorcycles and S$2 for other vehicles and which are valid from 
lo:15 am to 4:30 pm on weekdays and lo:15 am to 2:00 pm on Saturdays. Monthly licenses cost 20 
x the price of daily licenses and company vehicles pay a double rate because the fees are tax 
deductible. Owners of offending vehicles receive a summons within two weeks and a fine of S$70. 
Table 1. The initial Singapore ALS and subsequent modifications 
Implementation date RZ size Weekday hours 
(Ha) of operation 
Daily license fee in Singapore dollars* 
Private Company Taxi Commercial Motorcycle 
car car vehicle 
Initial scheme 
2 June 1975 
23June 1975 
1 August 1975 
610 
Subsequent changes 
1 January 1976 
1 April 1977 
1 March 1980 
13 February 1984 
19 November 1986 
1 June 1989 
Extended 
710 
I July 1989 
December 1989 
31 January 1990 
725 
3 January 1994 







Whole Day license 
M-F: 7:30am6:30pm 
Sat: 7:30 am-3:00 pm 
Part Day license 
M-F: 10: 15 am-4:30 pm 
Sat:lO:15 am-3:OOpm 
Restricted hours end at 
2:00 pm instead of 
3:00 pm on Sat 
3 3 0 0 0 
3 
4 8 4 
2 
5 10 
3 6 3 3 
1 
3 6 3 3 
2 4 2 2 
I 
0.70 
*Cars and taxis with at least four persons were initially exempt from ALS fees. In 1989, with the introduction of evening 
ALS, the exemption for carpools was eliminated. 
Sources: Gomez-Ibanez and Small (1994), p. 70; and The Straits Times, various dates. 
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A Road Pricing Scheme (RPS) was introduced on the East Coast Parkway (an expressway) in 
June 1995, partly to familiarize Singaporeans with linear passage congestion tolls (as opposed to 
the now familiar area congestion tolls) as a precursor to the introduction of Electronic Road Pri- 
cing which will involve both the area as well as the linear concept. Between 7:30 am and 8:30 am on 
weekdays except public holidays, drivers of all vehicles except scheduled buses, police vehicles, and 
emergency vehicles entering the East Coast Parkway at two locations are required to purchase and 
display an RPS license which costs S%OSO per day for motor cycles and S$l per day for other 
vehicles. Again, the monthly license is 20 x the cost of the daily license. A valid ALS license may 
be used as an RPS license. 
3. MANUAL ROAD CONGESTION PRICING: RESULTS 
As an immediate result of the implementation of the ALS in June 1975, traffic volume during 
the morning peak hours fell by 45% (New Nation, 1975), exceeding the original target of 25 to 
35%, and average speeds in the RZ during peak morning periods went up from 19 km h-r just 
before the implementation to 36 km h-’ by May 1991. The introduction of evening ALS from 
4:30pm to 7:OOpm and the extension of restrictions to goods vehicles and motorcycles in May 
1989 had a similar effect, reducing evening inbound traffic by 44% and traffic speeds averaged 
Restricted Zone of the Central 
Area 
soulxx : Singapore Public Works Department 
Fig. 1. Restricted zone of the central area. 
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33 km h-r (Menon, et al. 1993). Compared to average downtown peak hour vehicular speeds of 
10 km h-r in New York and 18 km h-’ in London, it is safe to say that the ALS was successful in 
solving the problem of traffic congestion. The ALS also led to a modal shift from private transpor- 
tation to public transit which increased its share from 33% in pre-ALS days to 69% (Menon, et 
al., 1993). 
However, traffic surveys in November 1992 (Singapore Feedback Unit, 1993) revealed that 
demand for entry into the RZ was higher just before (7:30am and 4:30pm) and just after 
(10:15am and 6:30pm) the two periods of restricted hours than during them (Fig. 2). To smooth 
out the peaks and troughs, in January 1994 the government responded to this distortion in traffic 
by introducing Whole-Day ALS from 7:30am to 6:30 pm on weekdays and from 7:30 am to 
3:00 pm on Saturdays with a two-tier shoulder-pricing system (Table 1). The results were exactly as 
predicted and hoped for. According to data provided by the Land Transport Authority, compar- 
ing traffic inbound volumes between May 1993 (before All-Day ALS) and May 1994 (after All- 
Day ALS), the following changes occured: 
May 1993 May 1994 Change 
7:00 am to 7:30 am (U) 8442 8363 -79 
7:30 am to 8:00 am (R) 5393 6960 + 1567 
8:00 am to 9:45 am (R) 34 475 43 340 -7865 
9:45am to 10:15am (R) 7917 9909 + 1992 
10:15am to 10:45am (U) 14 561 11 180 -3381 
4:00 pm to 4:30 pm (U) 12842 10746 -2076 
4:30 pm to 5:00 pm (R) 6796 8646 + 1850 
5:00 pm to 6:00 pm (R) 14361 17 292 +2931 
6:OOpm to 6:30pm (R) 7222 8043 +821 
6:30pm to 7:OOpm (U) 13 749 13207 -502 
Note the consistent changes in inbound traffic volumes. Half an hour before and after the pre- 
vious two-tier restricted periods (U for unrestricted), traffic volumes went down after the shoulder- 
priced Whole-Day ALS was implemented. Conversely, half an hour into and before the end of the 
two-tier restricted periods (R for restricted) traffic volumes went up after the shoulder-priced 
Whole-Day ALS was implemented. Furthermore, after the implementation of the Whole-Day 
ALS, morning traffic volume increased from 49 000 to 60 000, afternoon traffic volume decreased 
from 168 000 to 143 000, and evening traffic volume increased from 28 000 to 34 000. Looking at 
Fig. 2, all of this indicates that it is possible to smooth out the peaks and troughs in traffic volumes 
by the appropriate timing and shoulder-pricing of tolls, which gradually reduces the incentive to 
bunch-up travel during unrestricted or cheaper hours. 
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Fig. 2. Volume of traffic entering the restricted zone, November 1992. Source: Singapore Feedback Unit (1993), p. 2. 
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The implementation of RPS on the East Coast Parkway in June 1995 also resulted in a signifi- 
cant fall in traffic volume from 12 400 vehicles in May 1995 to 7300 vehicles in August 1995 during 
the restricted hours, with a corresponding 16% increase in travel speeds for public transportation. 
Manual road congestion pricing in Singapore has achieved its intended effect of restraining 
traffic volumes during peak periods and within congested areas and points. This has also been 
achieved at minimal capital and operating costs. Capital costs of the original ALS totaled S$6.6 
million in 1975, while the capital costs for the revised ALS in 1989 amounted to only S$170 000. In 
contrast, revenues from the sale of area licenses amounted to S$47 million in fiscal year 1993 
(Republic of Singapore Budget Documents, 1995) while expenses related to selling, enforcement, 
and maintenance were only 9% of revenues (Gomez-Ibanez and Small, 1994). 
4. THEORY OF ROAD CONGESTION PRICING AND SHORTCOMINGS OF THE ALS 
The theoretical foundation of road congestion pricing for allocative efficiency was first proposed 
by Pigou (1920) and Knight (1924) and was seriously advocated by the Smeed Report (1960) for 
use in the United Kingdom. The celebrated article by Walters (1961) followed by Thompson 
(1962), Roth (1967), Vickrey (1967), Solow (1973), and Pines and Sadka (1985) further developed 
the concept. Economists argue that traffic congestion arises because the marginal user of a crow- 
ded road takes into account only his or her private cost and ignores the fact that his or her vehicle 
slows down others. Thus the marginal social cost will exceed the marginal private cost of road 
usage and this discrepancy increases with traffic density. Neo-classical welfare theory therefore 
argues for a Pigovian toll on the use of congested roads to increase the individual cost of usage by 
an amount equal to the external diseconomies imposed by one commuter on all others to equate 
the marginal social cost with the marginal social benefit. 
For a review of the theory of road congestion pricing and optimal tolls, see the excellent article 
by Morrison (1986) and a comprehensive one by Hau (1992). Field (1992) and Toh (1977, 1992) 
have provided diagrammatic analyses of what constitutes an optimal toll within the framework of 
the ALS in Singapore. 
As we have seen, the ALS has succeeded in curbing road congestion in the CBD, but perhaps 
only too well. The ALS fees are simply too high, since the 45% reduction in traffic volumes far 
exceeded the target of 25 to 30% reduction that was originally intended, leading to underutilized 
roads. Every major study done on the ALS (Armstrong-Wright, 1986; McCarthy and Tay 1993; 
Toh, 1977, 1992; Watson and Holland, 1978; Wilson, 1988) has come to the same conclusion. 
More troubling as Toh (1977) and Wilson (1988) note, the congestion shifted to just before and 
after the restricted hours and to the peripheral ring roads. Wilson (1988) further noted that those 
who switched to buses contributed to increased travel times for all bus riders. Thus, using the 
Nash function as well as the Bentham and Sen welfare measures and World Bank data, he showed 
that all three measures indicated a decline in overall welfare. 
Furthermore, manual road congestion pricing in Singapore has become very complicated as 
today there are 16 types of licenses (Whole-Day ALS, Part-Day ALS, RPS, and daily and monthly 
licenses for three categories of restricted vehicles). Operators of motor vehicles must figure out what 
type of license to buy, and visual enforcement by the police has become very difficult as vehicles do 
not have to stop or slow down as they approach the gantry points. Moreover, the different licenses 
can be illegally switched between vehicles and enforcement in this regard is by the honor system. 
The ALS and RPS systems are very labor intensive requiring more than 120 people to manage 
them. But perhaps the most important drawback of the present manual road congestion pricing 
system from the perspective of allocative efficiency is that of unlimited entries into the RZ, result- 
ing in underpenalized contributions to traffic congestion, making it difficult to equate marginal 
social costs with marginal social benefits. Thus the need to consider a switch to Electronic Road 
Pricing. 
5. MOVING TO ELECTRONIC ROAD PRICING 
When the Hong Kong authorities conducted their experiments with Electronic Road Pricing 
(ERP) from July 1983 to March 1985 (Hau, 1990) the Singapore government watched the trials 
with great interest. The ERP technology is a passive system involving a read-only tag called an 
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electronic plate about the size of a video cassette tape mounted underneath the vehicle. Whenever 
a vehicle passes over a toll site or cordon point, inductive loops and antennas embedded in the 
pavement send out electronic signals to the moving vehicle and relay the vehicle’s identification 
code to a roadside computer. Motorists receive bills once a month giving the breakdown of toll sites 
crossed. Although the system proved to be technically feasible, it was not implemented because of 
popular rejection as a result partly of concerns over privacy of movement (Hau, 1990; Gomez- 
Ibanez and Small, 1994). Note that when a limited-scale multiple cordon based ERP system was 
introduced in The Netherlands, privacy was also an important public concern. 
Singapore therefore opted to go with a less intrusive active system with automatic instantaneous 
toll collections to skirt the privacy and billing problems. By November 1996, after five years of 
research, the CashCard was launched by a consortium of seven banks at a development cost of 
S$40 million. It is presently available nation-wide and can be used at selected retail outlets, and 
eventually for the payment of telephone calls, bus and taxi fares, car park fees, MRT, and ERP 
tolls etc. turning Singapore into a cashless society. 
As early as in 1989, anticipating advances in smart card technology, the government had 
announced plans to introduce ERP and therefore invited firms to submit tenders for a viable active 
system. Numerous trials were conducted, and after successive rounds of demonstrations and ten- 
ders, in October 1995, the government awarded the S$197 million ERP construction contract to a 
consortium comprising Philips Singapore, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Miyoshi Electronics, and 
CEI Systems and Engineering, that will also maintain the system for five years for another S$39 
million. An efficient, almost fail-safe and fraud-proof system is expected to be in place by the end 
of 1997. 
The technology will involve a complicated combination of radio frequencies, imaging and smart 
card technologies, optical detection, and cameras and computers working in unison (see Fig. 3). 
Each type of motor vehicle (car, taxi, commercial vehicle, and motorcycle) will be fitted with a 
color-coded in-vehicle unit (IU) on the bottom right corner of the windscreen or the center of 
a motorcycle’s handlebar with the IU connected to the motor vehicle’s battery. The IU, which 
is only slightly larger than an audio cassette tape and costing S$lOO, debits the toll from the 
CashCard every time the vehicle passes under a set of gantries. It has a liquid crystal display screen 
that will display the card’s stored-value balance and confirms every transaction. It also alerts the 
driver whenever cash balances are low or the smart card is faulty. The IUs will be permanently 
affixed so that they cannot be swapped among different categories of vehicles which will be 
charged varying rates to reflect vehicle size. Foreign motorists (mostly from Malaysia) may rent 
temporary IUs or install permanent ones if they visit Singapore regularly. 
Entry point gantries will work in pairs. The first gantry will have antennas which, via radio fre- 
quencies, will check the validity of stored-value CashCards in approaching vehicles after mutual 
verification. The antennas will conduct violation checks on the absence of CashCards or insufficient 
cash balances. It then executes debiting instructions to the IU. The second gantry has a set of 
optical presence detectors which pin-points the location and type of vehicle. A second set of 
antennas on the second gantry verifies if the correct deduction has been made, and verifies if the 
type of IU correctly corresponds to the type of vehicle in which it was installed. An outstation 
controller located at the side of the road links the information from the antennas and vehicle 
presence detectors to check for possible violations. If violations are detected, enforcement cameras 
mounted on the first gantry record the image of the rear license plate of the violating vehicle which 
is then forwarded to a central computer together with the transaction record. 
The ERP system to be implemented does not have toll booths or lane dividers and does not 
require vehicles to slow down. This requires the system to be able to handle cluttered vehicles 
traveling up to 120 km h-’ in a multilane traffic pattern with consecutive passings and lane changes 
as well as very close parallel passings with motor cycles in between (see Fig. 3). In other words, the 
system must have perfect correlation between all system components. Since it takes about 0.4 s for 
the algorithm to be completely sequenced, the set of two gantries must be placed at least 15 m 
apart. The permissible error rate is set at 1 error per 100000 passings. This is the target set by the 
Land Transport Authority for the Philips Consortium, which is currently conducting extensive 
tests prior to full-scale implementation by the end of 1997. Every attempt will be made to ensure 
that the errors are not of the false identification kind, because that would erode public confidence 
in the system. 
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It is expected that initially ERP will exactly duplicate the present manual road congestion pri- 
cing system: the ALS in the CBD and the RPS along the East Coast Parkway. There will be 35 sets 
of gantries to replace the 33 ALS gantries and the 2 RPS gantries. However, ERP is expected to be 
progressively extended to first cover congestion points along expressways and then to congested 
arterial and ring roads by the year 2000. 
6. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF ELECTRONIC ROAD CONGESTION PRICING AND SOME 
RESEARCH ISSUES 
The greatest advantage of ERP is that charges per entry can be more allocatively efficient than 
timed interval licenses with multiple entry privileges. Every time a vehicle enters, exits, and re- 
enters the RZ, it contributes to road congestion. This external diseconomy must be penalized. In 
this respect the ERP is a definite improvement over the ALS and RPS. Furthermore, Yee and 
Menon (1994) point out that toll charges can be made to vary with time, area, or distance traveled 
to reflect varying levels of road congestion. With ERP, it is also easier to introduce gradually 
tapering shoulder prices to even out traffic flow, as was achieved with two-tier All-Day ALS as we 
have seen. Ultimately, the vehicle detectors can help to calculate traffic volume, level of conges- 
tion, and adjust the optimal tolls accordingly to achieve Pareto optimality in road allocation. 
However, to achieve true allocative efficiency, four things are necessary. First, the tolls need to 
vary by time, place, and perhaps even distance; second the toll charges must be communicated in 
advance to be effective deterrents. Letting people know what is going to be charged is as important 
as charging the right amount, in order to achieve the full announcement effects of a tax to affect 
future behavior. In this respect, no other country has more experience than Singapore in the mass 
communication of impending changes in road tolls and charges. Third, there must be escape 
routes at every gantry or charge point. Otherwise, if motorists are trapped, then the tolls are no 
longer deterrents but merely revenue generators, and the objective of allocative efficiency is 
defeated. Fourth, the tolls must not be so high that the roads are underutilized to the point 
that there is no traffic congestion whatsoever. If this happens (just like when the ALS was first 
implemented in 1975) then there will be no divergence between the marginal social cost and the 
marginal private cost, which will now be represented by a straight horizontal line with zero cost 
elasticity, therefore rendering tolls irrelevant (see Toh 1992). As noted previously, every major 
study done on the ALS has lamented the under-utilization of roads because of excessive tolls. This 
must be avoided. 
Fortunately, the proposed ERP system in Singapore has some built-in efficiencies in that, unlike 
transitional toll booths, cars will not have to slow down, saving on time and fuel, and people will 
not have to carry the correct change. In other words, the ERP system in Singapore will be opera- 
tionally nonintrusive. And it is convenient. Depleted CashCards can be topped up at banks and 
automated teller machines and can be used for almost everything else eventually. The system is 
thought to be almost foolproof and fraud-proof although it will be important to confirm this. 
People will not be caught with the wrong license used at the wrong time or place, and IUs are not 
removable or interchangeable, unlike present area licenses. Furthermore, the cameras will provide 
documentary proof of violations, and CashCards which retain information on the last 30 passings 
can be checked in case of disputes. At a maximum false positive error rate of 1 in 100000, it is 
thought that protestations of system error will not be persuasive. However, this remains to be seen. 
The greatest disadvantage of the proposed ERP system, apart from the capital and maintenance 
costs, is the erection of many sets of visually unappealing gantries in an aesthetically and tourist- 
oriented country. Note that the number of road gantries initially will double because they work in 
pairs. The need for foreign cars to be fitted with IUs and CashCards may deter some Malaysian 
motorists from visiting Singapore and this may adversely affect local tourism. 
7. CONCLUSION 
When the Singapore government decided to go ahead with ERP, unlike Hong Kong it did not 
conduct cost benefit studies. This may be because in fiscal year 1993, it collected S$4.7 billion from 
taxes and levies on motor vehicles, with S$1.6 billion coming from the monthly auctions of COEs. 
Given the substantial contribution of motor vehicle taxes and auction incomes. ERP could be 
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implemented by using funds from user charges (the benefit principle). The five-year SS39 million 
operating cost of the ERP works out to S$39 million/ 5 years/ 642000 vehicles = S$12 per vehicle 
per year, insignificant considering the fact that the road tax on a subcompact Mazda 323 is S$1440 
a year. 
Part of the reason that Singapore decided to go ahead with ERP is that the government wants to 
relax the restrictions on car ownership. Thus, the government has announced that with the 
implementation of ERP by late 1997, the annual quota of 43000 new motor vehicles will be 
increased by between 9 to 12% (The Straits Times, November 11, 1996). This is important to 
satisfy the legitimate car-owning aspirations of middle-class Singaporeans. Although Singapore is 
now one of the richest countries in the world with a per capita income comparable to the United 
States, only 1 in 10 of her residents owns a car, compared to 1 in 2 in the United States. 
Everything considered, ERP is the most promising instrument to achieve Pareto optimality in 
road usage because it is very flexible and, as presently conceived, is operationally nonintrusive. 
The Singapore government believes that although the soon-to-be-implemented ERP system will 
not be perfect, it will be a major improvement over the present ALS and RPS (LTA White Paper, 
1996). 
Initially, ERP will replicate the ALS and RPS almost exactly, even to the location of the gantry 
points and escape routes, in order to minimize confusion with the new system. When the traveling 
public is used to ERP, the government intends to introduce differential tolls by time, area, distance 
traveled, and congestion levels to influence travel patterns and behavior, and will extend ERP 
nationwide to include expressways, arterial, and ring roads by the year 2000. There is no definite 
timetable for incremental implementation, as Singapore wants to monitor the technical workabil- 
ity of this new technology and intends to measure the resultant traffic patterns. Meanwhile, the 
world waits to see the results of this bold and interesting experiment in electronic road congestion 
pricing. 
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